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I found a very useful website for philosophy.
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http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/ – Polanyi society.
http://books.google.com/books?id=NDTDtuAC834C&pg=PA116&lpg=PA116&dq=scientific+knowledge+polanyi&source=web&ots=9oQPnK4kaE&sig=5bTCUIgylaIFCwEGZktksdoVAlE#PPA118,M1 - p116 polanyi and scientific knowledge
Michael Polanyi’s philosophy of science argued that there is no scientific method that can be transmitted as a logical and rigorous method to be learned in textbooks (or philosophy books). Science is learned by the practice that is transmitted from master to apprentice, as in the guilds of medieval and early modern Europe.
Chemistiest-turned-to-philosopher Polanyi rejected the idea that scientific knowledge are objective and neutral. He argued that all the human knowledge, including scientific knowledge has a hidden aspect, so that it cannot be articulated explicitly. Thus, he maintained that scientific knowledge can be only learned by practice.
Rejecting the notion that scientists are objective in the sense of detachment from preconceived hypotheses in the face of experimental results, Polanyi characterized this false ideal as harmless only because, in fact, it is disregarded by scientists. Only those apprentices who have worked their way through the socially organized system of science have the expertise that qualifies them to exercise the authority of natural science.
are not heretics driven by skepticism, but rather are steadfastly committed to established beliefs and dogmas within the scientific community. It is the social scientific community, not a rational scientific method, that is the determining condition of scientific knowledge.[1] By way of example, Polanyi published two essays dealing with chemistry and drawing from his own researches in x-ray crystallography, solid-state science, and adsorption of gases on surfaces.[2]
since the basis of scientific knowledge was inarticulable, no one could understand how best to advance science who was not a practicing scientist. There was no alternative, on Polanyi’s account, to unrestrained freedom of scientific inquiry, and administrative control of scientific resources by a scientific elite. A crucial part of scientific knowledge that is learned is tacit in character, so that it cannot be spoken, but only demonstrated and imitated. The system of scientific knowledge is a social system of authority and apprenticeship, which imposes discipline and which values tradition, while teaching expert skills. In contrast to histories of science which emphasize the work of revolutionary heroes, most scientific work is accomplished within the framework of beliefs or dogmas that provide the problems and answers for ordinary scientific work. Experimental results that first may appear to cast doubt on the accepted theoretical framework are generally assumed to be the results of experimental errors, not indications that a theory is false:[9] “if every anomaly observed in my laboratory were taken at its face value, research would instantly degenerate into a wild-goose chase after imaginary fundamental novelties.” Rejecting the notion that scientists are objective in the sense of detachment from preconceived hypotheses in the face of experimental results, Polanyi characterized this false ideal as harmless only because, in fact, it is disregarded by scientists. Only those apprentices who have worked their way through the socially organized system of science have the expertise that qualifies them to exercise the authority of natural science. Thus, had Polanyi returned explicitly to the problem of Lysenkoist genetics, he would have eliminated Lysenko as an authority in science on the grounds that he had not learned the practice of science through a valid system of apprenticeship.
In the longer run, Polanyi’s philosophy of scientific practice and tacit knowledge has influenced historians and sociologists of science, more than philosophers of science, perhaps because of the difficulty of following Polanyi’s attempt to define scientific knowledge as personal knowledge while avoiding its characterization as subjective knowledge. For Polanyi, science remains objective, not in the detachment of the knower from the known, but in the power of science to establish contact with a hidden reality based in the skills and commitment of the knower (e.g., Personal Knowledge, pp. 299-303, 311).
Greek ignored the importance of experience, comparing with something called reason and science. To them, scientific knowledge means university, totality, perfect, liberty; on the other hand, experiential knowledge indicates incompleteness, imperfect, non-liberty. Thus the depreciatory view of experience was identical with a conception that placed practical activity below theoretical activity, finding the former dependent, impelled from outside, marked by deficiency of real being, while the latter was independent and free because complete and self-sufficing: that is perfect (p.355).
Historically, knowledge deals with objective reality as it is in itself…(Dewey, 1929, p.355) Polanyi (1966) criticized the purpose of modern science, which is to establish an absolute and object knowledge, is an unachievable goal because it neglected the crucial aspect of knowledge as what he call “tacit knowledge” (what is it???) Thus , he criticized the process of building formal knowledge and excluding tacit knowledge as “self-defeating” (Polanyi, 1966, p.20). Polanyi argues that tacit knowing can bride the gap between ‘I-It’ and the I-Thou’ and be a transition from the natural sciences to social sciences. (1969, p.160)
Even now, “knowledge is still regarded by most thinkers as direct grasp of ultimate reality, although the practice of knowing has been assimilated to the procedure of the useful arts; involving, that is to say, doing that manipulates and arranges natural energies” (Dewey, 1929, p.357).
Natural science deals with facts borrowed largely from common experience (Polanyi, 1958, p.161)
http://www.jaist.ac.jp/~g-kampis/Course/Eight/Lecture_eight.html
“Both Quantum Mechanics and the theory of relativity are very difficult to understand; it takes only a few minutes to memorize the facts accounted for by relativity, but years of study may not suffice to master the theory and see these facts in its context. At all (these) points the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity.”
Tacit knowledge” has been all but hi-jacked by management gurus, who use it to refer to the stock of expertise within an organisation which is not written down or even formally expressed, but may nevertheless be essential to its effective operation.
Originally, Polanyi’s interest was in the kind of knowledge which we routinely use and take for granted, such as the ability to recognise the face of a friend: it is irreducible to explicit propositional knowledge and cannot be articulated. It cannot therefore be taught, although of course there is obvious evidence that it can be learned or acquired.”
“One of the most distinguishing features of Polanyi’s work is his insistence on overcoming
well established dichotomies such as theoretical vs. practical knowledge, sciences vs. the
humanities or, to put it differently, his determination to show the common structure
underlying all kinds of knowledge. Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher, was categorical
that all knowing involves skillful action and that the knower necessarily participates in all acts
of understanding. For him the idea that there is such a thing as “objective” knowledge, selfcontained,
detached, and independent of human action, was wrong and pernicious. “All
knowing”, he insists, “is personal knowing – participation through indwelling” (Polanyi and
Prosch, 1975:44; italics in the original).”
Polanyi (1969:147) remarks, “the way the body participates in the act of perception can be generalized further to
include the bodily roots of all knowledge and thought. […] Parts of our body serve as tools for observing objects
outside and for manipulating them”.
Polanyi, M. (1969) Knowing and Being, Edited By M. Grene, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
This is Lecture Eight
Causality and Logic in Thinking
A flashback from the Syllabus:
Causality and Logic in Thinking
mental models incorporate tacit knowledge; mental causation goes without reasoning and inference;
unlimited inconsistency tolerance in the mind; logic as an emerging feature in mental mechanisms
1. Tacit Knowledge
1.1. What is Tacit Knowledge
a famous concep,t which is everyone’s favorite
it’s a weak concept as such, but has a strong expressive power
generally known after Kuhn (1062) cited Polanyi (1958); several rounds of citation since then (most recently Nonaka et al).
reference: POLANYI M (1958) Personal Knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Polanyi, Michael (1891-1976)
“Polanyi`s concept of knowledge is based on three main theses: First, true discovery, cannot be accounted for by a set of articulated rules or algorithms. Second, knowledge is public and also to a very great extent personal (i.e. it is constructed by humans and therefore contains emotions, “passion”.). Third, the knowledge that underlies the explicit knowledge is more fundamental; all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.
“Both Quantum Mechanics and the theory of relativity are very difficult to understand; it takes only a few minutes to memorize the facts accounted for by relativity, but years of study may not suffice to master the theory and see these facts in its context. At all (these) points the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity.”
New experiences are always assimilated through the concepts that the individual disposes and which the individual has inherited from other users of the language. Those concepts are tacitly based. All our knowledge therefore rests in a tacit dimension.”
“Tacit knowledge” has been all but hi-jacked by management gurus, who use it to refer to the stock of expertise within an organisation which is not written down or even formally expressed, but may nevertheless be essential to its effective operation.
Originally, Polanyi’s interest was in the kind of knowledge which we routinely use and take for granted, such as the ability to recognise the face of a friend: it is irreducible to explicit propositional knowledge and cannot be articulated. It cannot therefore be taught, although of course there is obvious evidence that it can be learned or acquired.”
1.2. An introduction to Polanyi:
Tsoukas, H.: Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge? http://is.lse.ac.uk/events/esrcseminars/tsoukas.pdf
tacit knowledge is widely misunderstood as a particular kind of knowledge
cf. Eliasmisth in Internet Encyclopedia: tacit vs explicit is like “knowing how” and “knowing that” (after Ryle)
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/tacitknowledge.html
“One of the most distinguishing features of Polanyi’s work is his insistence on overcoming
well established dichotomies such as theoretical vs. practical knowledge, sciences vs. the
humanities or, to put it differently, his determination to show the common structure
underlying all kinds of knowledge. Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher, was categorical
that all knowing involves skillful action and that the knower necessarily participates in all acts
of understanding. For him the idea that there is such a thing as “objective” knowledge, selfcontained,
detached, and independent of human action, was wrong and pernicious. “All
knowing”, he insists, “is personal knowing – participation through indwelling” (Polanyi and
Prosch, 1975:44; italics in the original).”
“the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as
such to the person following them”
“Skills retain an element of opacity and unspecificity; they cannot be fully accounted for in terms of their particulars,
since their practitioners do not ordinarily know what those particulars are; even when they do know
them, as for example in the case of topographic anatomy, they do not know how to integrate
them (Polanyi, 1962: 88-90). It is one thing to learn a list of bones, arteries, nerves and
viscara and quite another to know how precisely they are intertwined inside the body (op.cit., p.89)
“How then do individuals know how to exercise their skills? In a sense they don’t.”
—> remember this later!!
Polanyi (1969:147) remarks, “the way the body participates in the act of perception can be generalized further to
include the bodily roots of all knowledge and thought. […] Parts of our body serve as tools for observing objects
outside and for manipulating them”.
Polanyi, M. (1969) Knowing and Being, Edited By M. Grene, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1.3. How to interpret tacit knowledge
It is totally misconstrued to think of tacit knowledge as something that “could” be made
explicit; as knowledge waiting for conversion or discovery.
It is more correct (ie closed to Polanyi’s and later Kuhn’s version) to think of tacit knowledge
as having to do with the condtions of knowledge – many of them biological, some social,
and several learned (as e.g. learning a profession).
As it were, many of the conditions of knowledge are themselves knowledge-like.
1.4. A critical assessment of Polanyi
Polanyi mixes several things, and his followers mix up even more.
Reading the texts, it becomes obvious that implicit and tacit are different components.
Skills are mostly implicit but maybe not tacit.
The tacit dimension however includes skills.
What is the difference?
Rriding a bycicle is a skill; knowing chemistry is (based on) tacit knowledge.
Skill is low-level, tacit knowledge is high-level.
Both are effortless, unmonitored (i.e. non-focal), etc.
In terms of my own terminology, skill is (closer to) the motoric part of an episode;
whereas tacit knowledge refers to (some part of) a mental model.
Their separation is a incomplete, because mental models coexist with the episode
which inlcudes motor parts etc. Yet it is clear that skill-like and tacit elements are
often different.
In some other aspect, Polanyi’s concern is Kantian.
“The way we look cannot be part of what we see”. – this is Kant’s enigma of the a priori.
(For, to be able to see at all, one needs something beforehand, a way to seeing)
Tacit knowledge includes factors hidden behind the open stage performance
of explicit reasoning, utterances, and judgments. In this regard, the notion of tacit
knowledge imnplies a criticism of the “public-process” view of the mind, which
focuses on the result of cognition, rather than the process itself. Exactly as in Kant -
where perception is the end of a story, not the beginning; it is the output of a complicated
system of interactions, rather than raw input for the mind.
2. Mental Models Support Tacit Knowledge
2.1. The Structure of Mental Models
There is a deductively available structure in mental models.
In other words, once we have accepted the notion of mental model as outlined
earlier, there will be several consequences: these bones show the place where the
flesh should go, and in this way we can deductively clothe up the entire skeleton.
One immedate consequence is the multi-layered nature of mental models by which we
can intepret logical properties of cognition as well as phenomena of tacit knowledge and
much else.
We are now going to discuss the relationship between explicit and implicit parts of
mental models, but need to take a byway first.
2.2. The Nature of Consciousness
and what it bears for mental models etc.
Consciousness is, in general terms, somebody else’s problem, but there are some disturbing facts.
There is a slight interference between the consciousness problem (1st person) and the scientific
problem of the mind (3rd person).
For instance, experience is the basis of embodied concepts – and experience is 1st person.
Then, consciousness is usually associated with focal attention and awareness, and hence it
sneaks into the discussion when talking about the relationship between overt (explicit) and
covert (tacit) knowledge, which is the question we will consider in the context of mental models.
So, some reflection is necessary. Here is a brief outline of a view of consciousness compatible with mental models.
Take it as it is – as a speculative, superficial account provided just for the sake of clarity.
- Consciusness may be like a flashlight that points at certain things in the mind and not others;
the place where it points changes dynamically.
- Mental models operate by their own causal powers; ie. consciousness has no specific causal
effect. (The question whether it has other, non-specific effects, such as increasing mental activity
or activating certain mechanisms in the mind, is left open.)
- Conscious attention concerns not entire mental models but their selected aspects or attributes
(such as propositions associated with them – hence the linguistic experience).
- Attributes made conscious serve like handles or hooks by which entire mental models are
activated. (Remember that we did not decide whether activation is by consiousness or otherwise)
The situation should be familiar from artificial intelligence and applied computer science.
“Objects” and “frames” contain structured information in “slots” and variables; instantiation of a variable or a slot
means instantiating an entire class to which the object belongs.
“Underlying the majority of these is the concept of object-orientation, namely the recognition that the decoupling of data and the code
that acts upon them, is based on an artificial distinction, and that models which combine the data and code into distinct “objects” offer
both more intuitive and a functionally richer conceptual entities. This paradigm shift can be particularly seen in three areas: programming
languages, databases and user-interfaces. Within programming, the evolution has been from procedural based languages where the code
was encapsulated within procedures and kept separate from the data, to object-oriented languages where the program is built up of self
contained “objects” which encapsulate both the data and the actions of the items being modeled.”
It can be no accident that the pyschological theories of remembering have long given up the videotape or storage room
notion of memory and have focussed, since F. Bartlett (1932), on “schemes”, or more recently, “scripts” etc.
All that this model of consciousnes implies is that the relevant mental unit of processing is not some selected element of focal
attention but an entire mental model – an entire “scheme”, or “script”, if you wish.
It might be frightening that “someone else” is doing the work inside, and “we are not masters in our mind” – but that’s not a
scientific argument. And it can be reversed – it is at the same time relaxing to see that the system does not depend
on willful operations in a fragile way (I, for one, could not sleep if this was the case…)
2.3. How Mental Models Support Tacit Knowledge
A mental model is like an iceberg, the largest part of it is “invisible”.
A mental model is a complex material entity that models actors and constraints of an episode; such a
mental model can be activated by any element of the episode or any reference to the actor(s).
An active mental model is identified for (and by) the self by means of some (few) marked attributes, which are related to
the activation enforcing elements.
Consequently, most (in fact almost all) of the mental model is unavailable for inspection and introspection, most of the time.
Mental models are ineffable.
In other words, mental models are “deep”;
there is always still more in them to get out.
This parallels the notion of causal depth and underlines our earler remark that mental models are material systems.
Explicit knowledge is transparent (“it can be overviewed”); therefore it is tempting to believe that transparency must
be a property of any knowledge.
- see the old alliance of transparency with rationalism and enlightenment
- see the misinterpretation of Polanyi in knowledge management; where “tacit” means “waiting to be discovered”
Is now a “deep” mental model indeed knowledge, if it’s not even available for operation?
The answer is yes.
Mental operation (as we remarked re consciousness) is autonomous, and does not depend on some transparent,
directly experienced, overt mental entities and their conscious manipulation by means of a central will.
If that picture is rejected (as the notion of mental model quasi forces us to reject it), the “availability for operation”
also obtains a new form. What is not available for an overt and conscious operation may still be available for
operations of a more fundamental kind.
2.4. Thinking and Mental Processes
Mental processes are
- not public (like the functioning of the heart —> why should the mind be any different? just because of
consciousness? that’s cheating – all the evidence is otherwise, and now we use the royal road to have
direct access? That can be – and is in fact – a very mischievous strategy)
- not transparent (contra Chomsky and the entire tradition of “mind is thought is language”)
- requires no effort – it just happens (Neural Networks and “relaxation” go in this direction!)
3. Logic and the Mind
3.1. Causality and Reasoning
Rather than being based on reasoning and inference, mental processes are autonomous and causal.
Mental models possess causal powers and work spontaneously.
Thinking is not the world of logical consequence but that of causal effect.
In particular, results of thinking do not depend on some isolated properties alone, such as the truth of
propositions.
It is a question, therefore, whether – and how – logical properties are maintained in thought.
3.2. Logical Properties
3.2.1 Deduction Follows Pre-Established Routes of Causality
it is wrong to look at deduction as a way to reach a conclusion
inference is a readout of a completed mechanism
deduction, in fact, is just public a posteriori justification of something that has already happened inside
deduction of this kind is not independent of “semantic” properties -
in the world of mental models (in the mind, in language etc) NOTHING ever follows from P (a proposition);
logical consequence is based on what P is.
Is there no room for formal logic then? Is there no domain-independence? How come that logic is so effective?
3.2.2. The Laws of Thought
Boole, De Morgan etc. 19. Century: truth tables and connectives; the birth of formal logic (Lullus’ program completed)
truth tables are (mostly) valid but irrelevant (—–> cf. Johnson-Laird: in my words, the solution of a logic puzzle is the
building of a narrative – of what happened - and not a truth table)
(several other remarks here. “logic” never goes without verb!! which makes it
suitable for telling a story. Te copula – is – is a special verb, difficult!!)
—–> empirical tests? just replace “runs faster than” by “is”, “is not”
irrelevant because they are just summaries
“connectives” (and, if, not, or) do connect – for the mental mechanisms, they are like flow pipes, or the wires in a network
that transfer activity; in fact they describe the routes by which the activity can flow. They are like (meta) constraints in
a mechanism consisting of elementary mechanisms linked by the connectives.
3.2.3. Logic as an Emerging Feature
Sometimes (or often – depending on ceteris paribus conditions) activities follow identical patterns under identical constraints.
Combinations that tend to follow the same identical pattern can be recognized as having an “abstract” validity.
This means that a (partial) generalization accross domains is possible.
Here is the double nature of logic:
writing logic is biulding a machine; so we can know (ie explain, predict) how works
but thinking means using this machine (as a flow of activities, a causal mechanism) rather than reasoning about it
4. Inconsistency and the Mind
Inconsistency? What inconsistency?
– Logician caught by his students trying to prove not A from A.
Logic produces consistency; the mind can use systems recognized in logic as formal systems but there
is more to the mind than just that.
The mind can also produce incosistency.
Much as mental models are mostly tacit, mental processing is mostly inconsistent.
- we know this as a phenomenon
- accordingly, there are several attempts do deal with inconsistency
paraconsisstent logic (Polish logic in particular)
non-monotonous logic (e.g. changing set of propositons, such as in time) – McDermott
- but mostly the concern is with consistency; inconsistency is considered as a deviation,
to be repaired (n-m-n) or accommodated (p-c-l).
Here the situation is different.
the basic situation of a system of metnal models is that of arbitrary inconsistency
imagine the mind as a multi-agent system, each making truth-claims
Why pursue consistency at all?
I believe this has to do with the extension of mental models towards universality.
Linkage of mental models with “and”?
From sitation dependent to situation independent knowledge
Matching the pieces into a larger picture.
Consistent subset = intensively used subset
Is consistency only an artifact in language? Probably yes….?
I don’t like to hear that… Sounds plausible though. This requires further research.
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http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/Kuhn.html – Outline
Quote summary
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/220/kuhn.htm
Review
http://brothersjudd.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/reviews.detail/book_id/439/Structure%20of.htm
http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/Kuhnsnap.htmlThroughout thirteen succinct but thought-provoking chapters, Kuhn argued that science is not a steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge. Instead, science is “a series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” [Nicholas Wade, writing for Science], which he described as “the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science.” After such revolutions, “one conceptual world view is replaced by another” [Wade]. A fundamental theme of Kuhn’s argument is that the typical developmental pattern of a mature science is the successive transition from one paradigm to another through a process of revolution. When a paradigm shift takes place, “a scientist’s world is qualitatively transformed [and] quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory.” Kuhn also maintained that, contrary to popular conception, typical scientists are not objective and independent thinkers. Rather, they are conservative individuals who accept what they have been taught and apply their knowledge to solving the problems that their theories dictate. Most are, in essence, puzzle-solvers who aim to discover what they already know in advance – “The man who is striving to solve a problem defined by existing knowledge and technique is not just looking around. He knows what he wants to achieve, and he designs his instruments and directs his thoughts accordingly.” During periods of normal science, the primary task of scientists is to bring the accepted theory and fact into closer agreement. As a consequence, scientists tend to ignore research findings that might threaten the existing paradigm and trigger the development of a new and competing paradigm. For example, Ptolemy popularized the notion that the sun revolves around the earth, and this view was defended for centuries even in the face of conflicting evidence. In the pursuit of science, Kuhn observed, “novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation.” Kuhn also took issue with Karl Popper’s view of theory-testing through falsification. According to Kuhn, it is the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that define the puzzles that characterize normal science. If, as Popper suggested, failure to fit were grounds for theory rejection, all theories would be rejected at all times. Thomas KuhnThomas Samuel Kuhn was born on July 18, 1922, in
Cincinnati, Ohio, United States. He received a Ph. D. in physics fromHarvard
University in 1949 and remained there as an assistant professor of general education and history of science. In 1956, Kuhn accepted a post at the
University of
California–
Berkeley, where in 1961 he became a full professor of history of science. In 1964, he was named M. Taylor Pyne Professor of Philosophy and History of Science at
Princeton
University. In 1979 he returned to
Boston, this time to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as professor of philosophy and history of science. In 1983 he was named Laurence S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Of the five books and countless articles he published, Kuhn’s most renown work is The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which he wrote while a graduate student in theoretical physics at Harvard. Initially published as a monograph in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, it was published in book form by theUniversity of
Chicago Press in 1962. It has sold some one million copies in 16 languages and is required reading in courses dealing with education, history, psychology, research, and, of course, history and philosophy of science. Structure has also generated a good deal of controversy, and many of Kuhn’s ideas have been powerfully challenged (see Weinberg link below). Throughout thirteen succinct but thought-provoking chapters, Kuhn argued that science is not a steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge. Instead, science is “a series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” [Nicholas Wade, writing for Science], which he described as “the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science.” After such revolutions, “one conceptual world view is replaced by another” [Wade]. Although critics chided him for his imprecise use of the term, Kuhn was responsible for popularizing the term paradigm, which he described as essentially a collection of beliefs shared by scientists, a set of agreements about how problems are to be understood. According to Kuhn, paradigms are essential to scientific inquiry, for “no natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism.” Indeed, a paradigm guides the research efforts of scientific communities, and it is this criterion that most clearly identifies a field as a science. A fundamental theme of Kuhn’s argument is that the typical developmental pattern of a mature science is the successive transition from one paradigm to another through a process of revolution. When a paradigm shift takes place, “a scientist’s world is qualitatively transformed [and] quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory.” Kuhn also maintained that, contrary to popular conception, typical scientists are not objective and independent thinkers. Rather, they are conservative individuals who accept what they have been taught and apply their knowledge to solving the problems that their theories dictate. Most are, in essence, puzzle-solvers who aim to discover what they already know in advance – “The man who is striving to solve a problem defined by existing knowledge and technique is not just looking around. He knows what he wants to achieve, and he designs his instruments and directs his thoughts accordingly.” During periods of normal science, the primary task of scientists is to bring the accepted theory and fact into closer agreement. As a consequence, scientists tend to ignore research findings that might threaten the existing paradigm and trigger the development of a new and competing paradigm. For example, Ptolemy popularized the notion that the sun revolves around the earth, and this view was defended for centuries even in the face of conflicting evidence. In the pursuit of science, Kuhn observed, “novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation.” And yet, young scientists who are not so deeply indoctrinated into accepted theories – a
Newton, Lavoisier, or Einstein – can manage to sweep an old paradigm away. Such scientific revolutions come only after long periods of tradition-bound normal science, for “frameworks must be lived with and explored before they can be broken.” However, crisis is always implicit in research because every problem that normal science sees as a puzzle can be seen, from another perspective, as a counterinstance and thus as a source of crisis. This is the “essential tension” in scientific research. Crises are triggered when scientists acknowledge the discovered counterinstance as an anomaly in fit between the existing theory and nature. All crises are resolved in one of three ways. Normal science can prove capable of handing the crisis-provoking problem, in which case all returns to “normal.” Alternatively, the problem resists and is labeled, but it is perceived as resulting from the field’s failure to possess the necessary tools with which to solve it, and so scientists set it aside for a future generation with more developed tools. In a few cases, a new candidate for paradigm emerges, and a battle over its acceptance ensues – these are the paradigm wars. Kuhn argued that a scientific revolution is a noncumulative developmental episode in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. But the new paradigm cannot build on the preceding one. Rather, it can only supplant it, for “the normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.” Revolutions close with total victory for one of the two opposing camps. Kuhn also took issue with Karl Popper’s view of theory-testing through falsification. According to Kuhn, it is the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that define the puzzles that characterize normal science. If, as Popper suggested, failure to fit were grounds for theory rejection, all theories would be rejected at all times. In the face of these arguments, how and why does science progress, and what is the nature of its progress? Kuhn argued that normal science progresses because members of a mature scientific community work from a single paradigm or from a closely related set and because different scientific communities seldom investigate the same problems. The result of successful creative work addressing the problems posed by the paradigm is progress. In fact, it is only during periods of normal science that progress seems both obvious and assured. Moreover, “the man who argues that philosophy has made no progress emphasizes that there are still Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has failed to progress.” As to whether progress consists in science discovering ultimate truths, Kuhn observed that “we may have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth.” Instead, the developmental process of science is one of evolution from primitive beginnings through successive stages that are characterized by an increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature. Kuhn argued that this is not a process of evolution toward anything, and he questioned whether it really helps to imagine that there is one, full, objective, true account of nature. He likened his conception of the evolution of scientific ideas to
Darwin’s conception of the evolution of organisms. The Kuhnian argument that a scientific community is defined by its allegiance to a single paradigm has especially resonated throughout the multiparadigmatic (or preparadigmatic) social sciences, whose community members are often accused of paradigmatic physics envy. Kuhn suggested that questions about whether a discipline is or is not a science can be answered only when members of a scholarly community who doubt their status achieve consensus about their past and present accomplishments. Thomas Kuhn was named a Guggenheim Fellow in 1954 and was awarded the George Sarton Medal in the History of Science in 1982. He held honorary degrees from institutions that included
Columbia
University and the universities of Notre Dame, Chicago, Padua, and
Athens. He suffered from cancer during the last years of his life. Thomas Kuhn died on Monday, June 17, 1996, at the age of 73 at his home in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was survived by his wife and three children.
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서정적이고 섬세한 문체로 사랑받은 5월의 琴兒(서울=연합뉴스) 김정선 기자 = “그리워하는데도 한 번 만나고는 못만나게 되기도 하고, 일생을 못 잊으면서도 아니 만나고 살기도 한다. 아사코와 나는 세 번 만났다. 세번째는 아니 만났어야 좋았을 것이다.”(‘인연’ 중)
25일 타계한 금아(琴兒) 피천득은 일상의 평범한 소재를 서정적이고 섬세하면서도 간결한 문체로 풀어낸 한국 수필문학계의 대표 작가다.
대표작 ‘인연’은 자신이 열일곱 되던 해부터 세 차례 접한 일본 여성 아사코와의 만남과 이별을 소재로 한 것으로, 학창시절 교과서에 실린 이 작품을 읽고 자란 세대들에게는 설렘과 안타까움이 교차하는 첫 사랑의 대명사가 됐다.
2002년에는 수필의 실제 주인공인 아사코를 소개하는 내용이 국내에서 방송됐을 정도였다.
수필가, 시인, 영문학자의 삶을 산 그는 1910년 5월29일 서울에서 태어나 중국 상하이(上海) 공보국 중학을 나와 호강대학에서 영문학을 전공했다.
광복 직후에는 경성대 예과 교수를 거쳐 1974년까지 서울대 영문과 교수로 재직했고 1954년에는 미국 국무부 초청으로 하버드대에서 1년 간 영문학을 연구하기도 했다.
수필가로 유명한 그의 문학 입문은 시가 먼저였다. 1930년 신동아에 시 ‘서정소곡’(抒情小曲)으로 등단한 뒤 잡지 ‘동광’에 시 ‘소곡’(小曲)(1932), 수필 ‘눈보라 치는 밤의 추억’(1933) 등을 발표했다.
1947년 첫 시집 ‘서정시집’(1947)을 출간한 그는 시간이 지나면서 ‘국민 수필가’로 불릴 정도로 수필을 통해 문학적 진수를 드러냈다.
“수필은 청자(靑瓷) 연적이다. 수필은 난(蘭)이요 학(鶴)이요 청초하고 몸 맵시 날렵한 여인”이라며 은유법을 구가한 수필 형식으로 쓴 수필론 ‘수필’은 ‘인연’과 함께 대표작으로 꼽힌다.
19세기 소설가 너대니얼 호손의 단편 ‘큰바위 얼굴’을 번역한 글을 포함 4편의 글로 1999년 2학기 국정 교과서 ‘국어’ 과목 수록작 저작권자 가운데 저작권료 수입 랭킹 1위를 차지하기도 했다.
춘원 이광수가 거문고를 타고 노는, 때 묻지 않은 아이의 마음을 닮았다고 붙여준 호 금아(琴兒)처럼 그는 딸 서영씨가 어릴 때 갖고 놀던 인형을 목욕시키고 머리를 묶어주는 등 인형놀이를 하는가하면 흠모하는 작가인 바이런, 예이츠의 사진과, 자신이 ‘마지막 애인’이라 불렀던 여배우 잉그리드 버그먼의 사진을 가까이 두는 소년의 모습을 간직했다.
어린이를 위해서는 자신의 발표작 가운데 어린이가 읽기 적당한 시와 수필 등을 엮어 ‘어린 벗에게’(2002년)를 냈다.
지난해에는 대표작 ‘인연’ 등 16편의 수필작품이 수록된 ‘피천득 수필집’이 처음으로 일본에서 출간돼 화제가 됐다.
그의 딸에 대한 사랑은 유별났다. 수필작품을 통해 여러번 딸의 이름을 부르며 부정(父情)을 나타냈다.
“서영이는 내 책상 위에 ‘아빠 몸조심’이라고 먹글씨로 예쁘게 써 붙였다. 하루는 밖에 나갔다 들어오니 ‘아빠 몸조심’이 ‘아빠 마음조심’으로 바뀌었다. 어떤 여인이 나를 사랑한다는 소문을 듣고 그랬다는 것이다. (중략) 아무려나 서영이는 나의 방파제이다. 아무리 거센 파도가 밀려온다 하더라도 능히 막아낼 수 있으며, 나의 마음 속에 안정과 평화를 지킬 수 있다.”(‘서영이’ 중)
미국에서 촉망받는 바이올리니스트 스테판 재키는 그가 그토록 사랑한 딸 서영씨와 남편 로먼 재키(MIT 물리학 교수)씨 사이에서 태어난 한국계 미국인이다. 외손자에 대한 그의 사랑도 매우 각별한 것으로 알려졌다.
그는 1973년 10월부터 글을 싣기 시작한 월간 교양지 ‘샘터’와 인연을 이어갔으며 2002년 8월에는 월드컵의 감동을 쓴 시 ‘붉은 악마’와 ‘Be the Reds!’가 적힌 티셔츠를 입고 환호하는 사진이 ‘샘터’에 실리기도 했다.
그는 자신이 세상을 떠나면 서초구 반포본동 자택에 있는 본인의 서재를 그대로 샘터 사옥으로 옮겨 달라고 샘터 측에 부탁했다.
서재라고 해서 거창한 것이 아니라 평소 보던 책, 안경, 메모 노트, 좋아하는 작가와 배우 사진 등으로 채워진 단촐한 공간이다.
‘피천득의 방’은 향후 파주출판단지에 세워질 샘터 새 사옥 설계도에 이미 자리 잡고 있다.
샘터 측은 “작은 아파트에서 책과 음악과 조용하게 살다 간 선생은 다작(多作)을 경계했다”며 “문단에 나온 뒤 그가 쓴 책 가운데 대표작을 꼽으라면 대표 수필을 엮은 수필집 ‘인연’과 시집 ‘생명’, 번역서 ‘내가 사랑하는 시’와 ‘셰익스피어 소네트 시집’ 등을 꼽을 수 있을 정도”라고 설명했다.
그의 문학관은 자신의 글에서 보여준 것과 같은 인생의 “아름다움” “인간 본연의 의지와 온정”의 문학이었다.
국내 원로ㆍ중진 문인이 문학에 입문한 과정을 들려준 책 ‘내 문학의 뿌리’(2005)에서 그는 “문학의 내용이 주로 아름다움으로 채워지기를 바란다”며 “슬픔이나 고통도 얼마든지 문학의 내용이 될 수 있지만 비운에 좌절되지 않는 인간 본연의 의지와 온정이 반드시 그 밑바탕이 돼야 한다”고 말했다.
그의 삶은 작가의 문체처럼 소탈하고 검소했다. 술과 담배는 평생 하지 않았고 산책과 클래식 음악을 좋아했으며 화려한 장식품 하나 없는 작은 아파트에서 살았다.
소박한 인생관을 가진 그는 지인들에게 자신의 사후에 대해 작은 바람을 말한 적이 있다.
“죽어서 천당에 가더라도 별 할 말이 없을 것 같아. 억울한 것도 없고 딱히 남의 가슴 아프게 한 일도 없고……. 신기한 것 아름다운 것을 볼 때마다 살아 있다는 것이 참 고맙고 다행이라고 생각해요. 훗날 내 글을 읽는 사람들이 ‘이 사람, 사랑을 하고 갔구나’ 하고 한숨지어 주기를 바라는 게 욕심이라면 욕심이죠. 그것도 참 염치없는 짓이지만….”
생일을 며칠 앞두고 떠난 그의 마지막 길은 가족과 평소 친하게 지낸 문학계 지인들이 함께 했다.
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http://www.wilderdom.com/experiential/SummaryJohnDeweyExperienceEducation.html
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For John Dewey, education and democracy are intimately connected.
According to Dewey good education should have both a societal purpose and purpose for the individual student. For Dewey, the long-term matters, but so does the short-term quality of an educational experience. Educators are responsible, therefore, for providing students with experiences that are immediately valuable and which better enable the students to contribute to society. Dewey polarizes two extremes in education — traditional and progressive education. The paradigm war still goes on — on the one hand, relatively structured, disciplined, ordered, didactic tradition education vs. relatively unstructured, free, student-directed progressive education. Dewey criticizes traditional education for lacking in holistic understanding of students and designing curricula overly focused on content rather than content and process which is judged by its contribution to the well-being of individuals and society. On the other hand, progressive education, he argues, is too reactionary and takes a free approach without really knowing how or why freedom can be most useful in education. Freedom for the sake of freedom is a weak philosophy of education. Dewey argues that we must move beyond this paradigm war, and to do that we need a theory of experience. Thus, Dewey argues that educators must first understand the nature of human experience. Dewey’s theory is that experience arises from the interaction of two principles — continuity and interaction. Continuity is that each experience a person has will influence his/her future, for better or for worse. Interaction refers to the situational influence on one’s experience. In other words, one’s present experience is a function of the interaction between one’s past experiences and the present situation. For example, my experience of a lesson, will depend on how the teacher arranges and facilitates the lesson, as well my past experience of similar lessons and teachers. It is important to understand that, for Dewey, no experience has pre-ordained value. Thus, what may be a rewarding experience for one person, could be a detrimental experience for another. The value of the experience is to be judged by the effect that experience has on the individual’s present, their future, and the extent to which the individual is able to contribute to society. Dewey says that once we have a theory of experience, then as educators can set about progressively organizing our subject matter in a way that it takes accounts of students’ past experiences, and then provides them with experiences which will help to open up, rather than shut down, a person’s access to future growth experiences, thereby expanding the person’s likely contribution to society. Dewey examines his theory of experience in light of practical educational problems, such as the debate between how much freedom vs. discipline to use. Dewey shows that his theory of experience (continuity and interaction) can be useful guides to help solving such issues. Throughout, there is a strong emphasis on the subjective quality of a student’s experience and the necessity for the teacher of understanding the students’ past experiences in order to effectively design a sequence of liberating educational experiences to allow the person to fulfil their potential as a member of society. Reference Dewey, J. (1938/1997). Experience and education. Macmillan. |
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(10:28pm) Video project presentation went well more than I expected. Initially I tested mime with the instructor’s computer. Yet, somehow sound did not come out. Fortunately, I was not the only one. Christ also had the same problem with mine. Thus, we hooked up the speakers with Chris’ computer and made a presentation from there. It was good. My audience’s reaction was also good………………….
Dr.Robin asked a couple of questions to me after the presentation. But I could not answer it. Brian also asked three questions. Image change, and Text pop-up..He has a keen observation. After the class, I talked with him about what was going on about me and Wendy. I hope I do not make an awkward relationship with Dean because of her. He seemed like a bit angry at me.
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http://www.seoprise.com/board/view.php?table=seoprise9&uid=300284
사는 것이 곧 느끼는 것이다 – 프랑스 낭만주의와 루소 안녕하세요. 류가미입니다. 오늘은 지난 시간에 이야기한대로 고전주의를 마무리하고 낭만주의에 대해서 알아볼까 합니다.
18,19세기 유럽의 고전주의는 조화와 균형을 중시하는 그리스 고전 시대의 미학에 따라 작품들을 창작하자는 문예운동이었습니다. 사실 18.19세기 고전주의자들이 이상으로 삼고 있는 그리스 고전 시대는 150년 남짓한 짧은 기간입니다. 그리스 고전 시대는 페르시아와 전쟁에서 이긴 기원전 480년부터 알렉산더 대왕이 페르시아를 정복하고 헬레니즘 제국을 세운 330년까지의 시간을 말합니다.
이 짧은 시기에 그리스는 놀라운 발전을 합니다. 정치적으로 페리클레스가 나와 아테네 시민 민주주의를 완성했고 철학가 중에서는 소크라테스, 플라톤, 아리스토텔레스가 등장해 서구의 철학의 기초를 다졌습니다. 또 작가로는 아이스킬로스, 소포클레스, 에우리피데스가 활동했고 조각가로는 원반 던지는 사람으로 유명한 마론과 파르테논 신전을 감독한 페이디아스가 활동했습니다. 사실 이 150년 동안의 짧은 시기에 현재 세계적으로 통용되고 있는, 정치, 철학, 예술의 기본적인 모델이 완성되었다는 것은 굉장히 놀라운 일입니다.
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| ▲ 그리스 고전 시대에 건설된 대표적인 건축물, 파르테논 신전 http://www.mccullagh.org/db9/1ds-12/parthenon-side-view.jpg | ||
그리스 고전 시대를 바라보면, 문화강국이라는 것이 무엇인가라는 생각이 들게 됩니다. 그리스는 우리처럼 반도로 되어 있는 국가입니다. 반도 국가는 대륙 세력과 해양세력이 부딪히는 지점입니다. 때문에 이런 나라들은 전쟁이 끊이지 않고 잘못하면 독립마저도 유지하기 힘듭니다. 사실 고대 그리스의 영광이란 저 150년 동안의 고전 시대가 전부입니다.
기원전 388년 알렉산더 대왕이 아버지였던 필립포스 2세는 그리스를 마케도니아에 복속합니다. 그 후 한동안 그리스는 마케도니아의 영토였다가 기원전 168년 마케도니아가 로마에 패한 뒤, 로마의 식민지가 됩니다. 그리고 1453년 투르크(터키)가 동로마 제국을 멸망시킨 후에는 투르크의 영토가 됩니다. 그리스가 터키에서 벗어나 독립한 것은 1829년의 일입니다. 그러니까 그리스는 기원전 388년부터 1829년 약 2200년 동안 남의 나라의 식민지였던 셈입니다.
군사적으로 정치적으로 볼 때 그리스는 분명히 약한 나라입니다. 그러나 문화적으로 볼 때 그리스는 결코 약한 나라가 아닙니다. 그리스는 유럽, 아니 지금 세계문명을 이끄는 정치, 철학, 예술의 기준을 세웠기 때문입니다. 지금 형식상 지구상에서는 그리스에서 발생한 민주주의 제도를 받아들이지 않는 나라가 없습니다. 세계에 있는 모든 대학에서는 교양으로 고전시대의 철학과 예술을 가르칩니다. 칼 보다 펜이 강하다고 믿는 사람들에게 그리스는 역사상 지구상에 있었던 그 어떤 나라보다 강한 나라입니다.
고대 그리스는 우리에게 앞으로 우리가 나아갈 방향을 보여주고 있습니다. 그리스가 마케도니아, 로마, 터키(페르시아)라는 거대한 제국들 틈 바구니에 끼어있었다면 우리나라 역시 중국, 러시아, 미국(과 일본) 열강들 사이에 끼여 있습니다. 솔직히 이런 열강들 사이에서 우리나라가 패권국가로 성장한다는 것은 불가능합니다.
그러나 우리는 이들 열강 사이에서 힘의 균형을 맞추는 중재자 역할을 할 수는 있을 것입니다. 또한 다양한 세계 문화를 받아들여, 새로운 정치, 철학, 예술의 기준을 만들어내는 일도 할 수 있을 겁니다. 그리스가 에게해 연안의 다양한 나라들과 레반트의 문화를 받아들여 국제적으로 통용될 수 있는 새로운 문화의 기준을 만들어낸 것처럼 말입니다.
자 이제 고전주의에 대한 이야기를 접고 낭만주의라는 새로운 문예 운동으로 넘어가 봅시다. 17, 18세기 고전주의가 고대 그리스 고전 시대를 그 모델로 하고 있다면 18. 19세기에 유행했던 낭만주의는 중세를 그 모델로 삼고 있습니다. 낭만주의(romantism)는 로망(roman)이라는 말에서 유래되었습니다. 여기서 로망은 프랑스 브르타뉴 지방에 켈트 족들이 사용했던 갈로-로망어를 뜻합니다.
노르망디 왕조가 영국과 프랑스 서쪽 해안을 지배하게 되면서 켈트족의 전설은 바로 이 로망어로 새롭게 창작됩니다. 그것이 우리가 앞서 살펴보았던 트리스탄과 이졸데, 파르치발, 아서왕과 원탁의 기사 같은 중세 기사 문학들입니다.
그 후로 로망이라는 말은 확장되어 로망어로 쓰인 기사문학 뿐만 아니라 이에 영향을 받은 환상적인 이야기들을 모두 일컫는 말이 됩니다. 그 때문에 로망의 형용사형인 로만틱(romantic)이라는 단어는 이상하고 신비하고 괴상하면서도 환상적이라는 뜻을 갖게 되었습니다. 그러나 이성과 명정함, 조화와 균형을 강조하는 고전주의 시대에는 로망이 담고 있는 기괴함, 상상력, 비현실성이라는 가치는 주목받지 못했습니다.
로망이란 단어가 긍정적인 의미를 갖게 된 것은 18세기 이후의 일입니다. 18세기에 들어서자, 이성을 중시하는 고전주의에 대한 반발이 일어났습니다. 이제 사람들은 이성보다는 감성, 완결된 형식보다는 자유로운 상상력에 더 많은 관심을 보입니다.
그와 더불어 로만틱이라는 형용사가 가지고 있었던 기괴하다는 뜻은 ‘독창성’, ‘창조성’, ‘천재성’과 같은 뜻으로 변화합니다. 그리고 18세기 후반에 낭만주의 운동이 일어나자, ‘로만틱’이라는 말은 고전주의와 대립되는 스타일을 가리키는 말이 됩니다.
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| ▲ 문예운동으로서의 낭만주의 개념을 만든 프리드리히 폰 슐레겔 http://www.lancs.ac.uk/depts/philosophy/awaymave/ 408new/images/friederich_von_schlegel.jpg | ||
‘로만틱’이라는 단어를 처음으로 문예 이론에 끌고 온 사람은 바로 슐레겔 형제였습니다. 1798년으로 독일 평론가 프리드리히 폰 슐레겔(Friedrich von Schlege, 1772-1829)과 그의 형 아우구스트 빌헬름 폰 슐레겔(August Wilhelm von Schlege, 1767-1845)은 아테네움(Athenaeum)이라는 동인지에서 이 말을 처음 사용했습니다.
아테네움은 1798에 창간되어 1800 폐간된, 겨우 2년 동안만 지속된 잡지였습니다. 별로 인기가 없어 돈 벌이가 못되는 그런 잡지였던 모양입니다. 그런데 이 잡지가 가지는 문학사의 의미는 자못 큽니다. 이 잡지에는 슐레겔 형제 이외도 노발리스와 박켄노더 그리고 티이크 같은 사람들이 참여했습니다. 사실 문예사조로써 낭만주의라는 말을 만든 것은 바로 이 사람들이었습니다.
프리드리히 본 슐레겔은 로만틱이라는 말을 고전주의와 대비되어 근대적 가치를 지칭하는 말로 사용했습니다. 술레겔은 낭만주의 이론을 펼치면서 보편성보다는 특수성에 초점을 맞춥니다. 그 때문인지 낭만주의는 향토성과 개인의 주관성을 강조합니다. 낭만주의는 이성보다 인간의 본성, 다시 말해 감정을 더 신뢰하며 틀에 박힌 형식미보다는 자유로운 상상력에 더 중요하다고 봅니다.
고전주의가 보편성을 추구한다면 낭만주의는 인간의 주관적인 내면세계를 표현하려고 합니다. 낭만주의가 표현하고자 했던 것은 인간의 삶을 가로지르는 저 초월적인 무엇과 그것에 대해 느끼는 연민과 공포 같은 지독히 인간적인 감정입니다.
또한 기존의 관습을 파괴한다는 데에서 낭만주의는 교회법과 맞서던 르네상스 시대 휴머니즘과 연결됩니다. 낭만주의는 인간의 본성을 억압하는 모든 관습에 항거합니다. 사실 고전주의와 낭만주의는 정치적으로 서로 반대 입장을 취하고 있습니다. 고전주의가 절대 왕정을 주장하던 루이 14세의 궁전에서 꽃을 피웠다면 낭만주의는 새롭게 성장한 시민 사회를 바탕으로 하고 있기 때문입니다.
고전주의가 귀족들의 문화였다면 낭만주의는 시민들의 문화입니다. 그런데 여기서 말하는 시민이라는 바로 부르주아지(bourgeoisie)들입니다. 그들은 이탈리아 자유도시의 시민들과 성격이 조금 다릅니다. 여러분들도 아시다시피, 이탈리아 자유도시 시민들은 지중해 무역으로 번 돈으로 영주로부터 자치권을 사왔습니다. 때문에 그들은 영주의 성에 거주하지 않았습니다.
그러나 부르주아지는 성(城, bourg)에 살고 있는 사람을 말합니다. 중세 장원은 성과 그에 따른 농경지로 나누어집니다. 성벽으로 둘러싸인 성은 요새이자 도시로서, 이곳에는 영주가 사는 궁이나 그를 모시는 귀족들이 저택뿐만 아니라 금융업이나 상업을 하거나 법률이나 의술 같은 서비스를 제공하던 부르주아지들이 사는 집들이 있었습니다. 반면 농사를 짓던 농노들은 성밖에 있는 농경지 옆에 촌락을 이루고 살았습니다.
사실 부르주아지들은 귀족들과는 달랐지만 또한 농노들하고도 달랐습니다. 부르주아지들은 귀족들처럼 정치에 참여할 권리는 없었지만 농노들과 달리, 돈을 벌 수 있는 생산 수단을 가지고 있었습니다. 그래서 그들을 유산 계급이라고도 합니다.
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| ▲ 낭만주의는 시민혁명과 산업 혁명을 시대적 배경으로 하고 있다. 들라크루아 작, 민중의 이끄는 자유의 여신 http://www.artinvest2000.com/delacroix_liberty.jpg | ||
부르주아지들은 자본을 축적하면서 점점 더 왕과 귀족들에 맞서는 세력으로 커갑니다. 그들은 근대 산업혁명의 주체이자 또한 시민 혁명의 주체이기도 합니다. 그리고 낭만주의는 부르주아지들이 이끌었던 미국의 독립전쟁, 프랑스 시민혁명, 영국의 산업혁명을 배경으로 꽃 핍니다.
미국의 독립전쟁과 프랑스 대혁명 같은 시민 혁명들이 일어났던 18세기 후반의 낭만주의를 전기 낭만주의라고 하고 산업화가 본격화되었던 19세기의 낭만주의를 후기 낭만주의라고 합니다. 이렇게 시대를 구분하는 것은 시대에 따라 낭만주의의 성격이 달라지기 때문입니다.
18세기 낭만주의는 부상하고 있는 부르주아지의 편에 서서 구체제를 전복시키려고 했다면 19세기 낭만주의는 한 때 자신의 편이었던 부르주아지의 속물주의를 비판하는 데 모아집니다. 사실 초기 낭만주의자들은 부르주아지가 왕과 귀족들을 내쫓고 평등하고 정의로운 세상을 만들어줄 것이라고 기대했습니다. 그러나 시민혁명으로 부르주아지들이 권력을 잡고, 산업혁명으로 거대한 자본을 형성하자, 그들은 구시대에 귀족들과 별로 다를 바가 없는 착취자라는 사실이 밝혀집니다.
낭만주의는 인간에 대한 희망으로 시작했다가 인간에 대한 절망으로 끝납니다. 그래서 낭만주의에는 동경과 도피, 순수와 퇴폐가 공존합니다.
낭만주의는 시기적으로만 구분되는 것이 아니라 지역에 따라서도 구분됩니다. 낭만주의 운동은 18세기 중엽 프랑스, 독일, 영국에서 동시다발적으로 시작되었습니다. 그러나 각국의 낭만주의 성향은 조금씩 달랐습니다. 그것은 각국의 낭만주의의 사상적 토대가 달랐기 때문입니다. 영국의 낭만주의는 인간은 자기 행복을 추구할 권리가 있다는 자각과 연결되어 있다면 프랑스 낭만주의는 프랑스 대혁명을 이끌었던 시민운동과 관련이 있습니다. 반면 독일 낭만주의는 인간의 감각으로 지각할 수 없는 저 초월적인 세계에 대한 동경을 담고 있습니다.
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| ▲ 영국 낭만주의의 사상적 기반이었던 존 로크. http://www.malaspina.com/jpg/locke.jpg | ||
영국의 낭만주의의 이론적 토대를 존 로크(1632-1704)에서 찾아볼 수 있다면 프랑스 낭만주의의 이론적 토대는 바로 장 자크 루소(1712-1778)에게서 찾아 볼 수 있습니다. 또한 독일 낭만주의 이론적 토대는 바로 임마누엘 칸트(1724-1784)에게서 찾아볼 수 있습니다. 오늘 이 시간에는 존 로크의 사상을 이야기하고 나머지 두 사람에 대한 이야기는 다음 시간으로 미룰까 합니다.
낭만주의는 인간의 본성에 대한 긍정으로 시작되었습니다. 중세나 고전주의 시대 로망이라는 말은 괴기스럽고 이상하다는 뜻이었습니다. 그러나 낭만주의가 시작되면서 이 말은 탁월함과 창조성을 뜻하는 의미로 변했습니다. 다시 말해, 낭만주의는 남과 다른 인간의 개성이 괴기스럽고 이상한 것이 아니라 탁월함 또는 창조성과 연결되어있다고 봅니다.
이런 면에서 낭만주의는 그리스 -로마 시대의 철학적 전통을 이어받고 있습니다. 고대 그리스-로마의 철학은 인간의 본성을 긍정합니다. 소크라테스는 인간의 탁월함(arete)이 그의 지혜에 있다고 했습니다. 그리스 고전철학을 이어받은 스토아 철학 역시 이러한 소크라테스의 주장을 그대로 받아들입니다. 그런데 스토아학파는 이 지혜가 본성에 따라 (according to nature) 살 때 가능해진다고 보았습니다. 스토아학파는 인간의 본성은 근본적으로 이성적이며 선한 것이므로 본성에 따라 살 때 덕을 이룰 수 있고 이러한 덕을 이룰 때 기쁨과 아름다움을 얻을 수 있다고 주장합니다. 사실 스토아 학파의 이러한 사상은 자연법 사상에 영향을 미쳤습니다.
자연법은 실정법에 대비되는 개념입니다. 실정법이 민족이나 사회에 따라 내용이 달라지는 것에 비해, 자연법은 민족과 사회와 시대를 초월해 영구불변하고 보편타당한 법률을 말합니다. 다시 말해서 스토아학파는 인간이 자기 본성인 이성에 따라 행동하는 것이 바로 보편적인 질서에 맞는 일이라고 본 것입니다.
그러나 헬레니즘의 등불이 꺼지고 중세 암흑기에 접어들자, 이와 같은 인간에 대한 관점에도 변화가 일어났습니다. 중세를 지배한 기독교는 인간의 본성을 부정적으로 보았기 때문입니다. 기독교 교리에 따르면, 인간은 태어나면서 가지고 나오는 원죄가 있습니다. 원죄는 대대로 유전되는 죄인데, 그것은 타락하기 쉬운 인간의 성향을 말합니다. 이렇게 타락하기 쉬운 인간을 구제하는 유일한 방법은 교회법으로 인간을 강력하게 제지하는 것입니다. 그렇게 그리스-로마 고전 시대의 자연법은 중세에는 교회법으로 대치됩니다.
그러나 르네상스 시대에 그리스-로마 고전 문화가 부활하면서 유럽의 전통적인 인간관도 되살아나기 시작했습니다. 서서히 사람들은 인간의 본성에 대해서 보다 긍정적으로 생각하기 시작합니다. 또한 종교개혁으로 중세 시대 사람들을 얽어매었던 교회법이 전 보다 느슨해집니다. 그러나 교회법이 권위를 잃은 그 자리에 대신하는 것은 자연법이 아니라, 절대 왕정의 국가법이었습니다.
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| ▲ 홉스는 인간이 본성이 악하다고 보았고 그래서 국가법으로 인간의 본성을 강하게 억눌러야 한다고 주장했다. http://www.whothefuckcares.dk/filosofi/thomas-hobbes/thomas-hobbes.jpg | ||
절대왕정을 지지했던 홉스(1588-1679)는 전통적인 기독교의 인간관 쪽에 서서 인간의 본성이 악하다고 주장합니다. 그에 따르면, 인간을 자연 상태로 방치하면 만안의 만인에 대한 투쟁이 일어나기 때문에 사회는 혼란에 빠지게 됩니다. 이러한 혼란을 막기 위해서, 인간은 자신의 자유를 제한하고 자신의 권리를 통치자에게 넘겨야 합니다. 홉스는 사회적 안정을 이루기 위해서는 통치자에 대한 절대적 복종이 필요하다고 생각했습니다.
반면 로크(1632-1704)는 인간의 본성이 선하다고 보았습니다. 그는 인간을 자연 상태로 방치해도 그 나름대로의 질서를 유지할 수 있다고 주장합니다. 다만 개인 사이에 생길 수 있는 분쟁을 중재해주고 외부의 침략으로부터 자연권(자유, 생명, 재산)을 지키기 위해서 사람들이 통치자와 계약을 맺고 그에게 자신들의 권리 일부를 신탁했다고 봅니다. 홉스와 달리, 로크에게 통치자의 권위는 절대적이 아니라 조건적인 것이었습니다.
로크에 따르면, 개인은 편의에 의해서 통치자와 계약을 맺었을 뿐, 자신의 권리를 포기한 것이 아닙니다. 따라서 통치자는 개인의 재산권과 사상, 언론, 종교의 자유를 보호할 의무가 있고 개인은 상호 계약에 의해서 만들어진 시민법을 자발적으로 복종할 의무가 있습니다. 그리고 통치자가 애초의 계약을 어겼을 때는 개인들은 그에 맞서 저항할 수 있는 권리를 가집니다.
로크는 인간이 자신의 생명과 자유와 재산을 지킬 천부적인 권리를 가졌다는 생각에서 한 발자국 더 나아가 인간은 자신이 행복을 추구할 권리를 가졌다고 주장합니다. 그에 따르면, 행복추구권은 인간의 기본적인 권리이자 의무입니다. 인간은 마땅히 고통이 없는 상태 또는 만족감을 느낄 수 있는 상태를 추구해야 합니다. 로크에 의해, 행복추구권이라는 개념이 생겨나자 수많은 사람들에 의해 행복에 대한 다양한 고찰들을 내놓습니다. 누구누구의 행복론 이란 책들이 등장하게 된 것이지요.
18세기 등장했던 그 수많은 행복론을 요약하면 행복은 도덕과 병행한다는 것입니다. 그것은 인간은 도덕을 지키지 않고서는 행복해질 수 없다는 말이자 동시에 인간의 본성을 제약하고 인간을 불행하게 만드는 도덕은 제대로 된 도덕이 아니라는 주장이기도 합니다.
이와 같은 상황에서 감수성(sensibilite)이라는 개념이 부상합니다. 감수성은 18세기 사람들에게 있어서 중요한 가치이자 덕목이었습니다. 감수성이라는 것은 자신과 타인의 본성을 이해하고 그것을 표현하는 것입니다. 감수성은 나의 행복을 위해서 꼭 필요한 요소이자, 타인의 행복을 위해서도 꼭 필요한 요소이기도 합니다.
18세기 사람들은 감수성을 통해서 단순히 행복을 느끼는 것이 아니라 자신의 존재자체를 확인하려고 했습니다. ‘사는 것은 곧 느끼는 것이다’라는 루소의 주장은 이러한 맥락에서 나온 것이었습니다.
전시대의 사람인 데카르트는 ‘나는 생각한다 고로 존재한다’고 주장했습니다. 자신의 존재감을 사고에서 찾았던 것과 달리, 루소는 자기 존재감을 감수성에서 찾아냅니다. 루소는 인간은 생각하는 것보다 먼저 느끼며, 감수성이야 말로 인간이 공유하는 운명이라고 말합니다.
또한 루소는 첫 번째 낭만주의 소설이라고 할 수 있는 ‘쥘르, 신 엘로이즈’를 쓴 사람이기도 합니다. 다음 시간에는 그의 인생과 그의 소설에 대해서 알아볼까 합니다. 그 때까지 모두들 편안하시길….
ⓒ 류가미
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In spite of an intriguing title of this posting , the message is pretty simple.
The author aruged that we need to memorize English as much as we can.
I can be a better Englsih speak and writer. It was proved that writing a story is effective not only writing itself but also speaking. In particular, writing the story is useful when I need to explain a certain phenomena or happening in detail. Go Sun-hong
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Narrative research : Political issues and implications by Freema elbaz- luwisch
I identified a series of methodological and epistemological issues about what narrative research is , how it is conducted , what its purposes are, how narrative knowledge is validated and what the roles and responsibilities of the various participants are. . P.75
I wondered about who has the authority to legitimate new varieties or conceptualizations of knowledge; about how power is used and shared in interviews and other research activities; about the nature and existence of such entities as subjects and objects, and who makes the distinction between them, granting equality or supremacy to one or the other; about how new ways of understanding human nature gain legitimacy; about how the distinction between public and private is currently changing, and what the implications are for society, and for social and educational research. Finally, I thought about what makes a good story, and whose tats and standard are authorized to make this judgment. . P.75
Narrative research makes use of personal materials such as life story, conversation and personal writing; of necessity these invite reflection and reflexivity (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990). Reflection brings the narrative researcher up against the edges of the work, and requires him or her to examine the context within which the research is carried out and its broader implications. . P.75
These matters are not necessarily political in themselves, but all of them have political aspects; in addition the conduct of narrative research in itself highlights the political because it is research ‘against the grain” within the academic world, challenging the dominance of more established modes of inquiry. P.75
I will consider the fact that narrative research rests heavily upon a new conceptualization of knowledge and research, a “new paradigm” : what Bruner (1986) has referred to as “narrative knowing” as distinct from “paradigmatic knowing.” Second, the fact that much narrative inquiry is conducted collaboratively will be considered. Finally, narrative knowing rests on a new understanding of subjectivity, and an attempt to redraw the distinction between public and private, and the political implications of these changes for the stud of teaching will explored. P.76
In a recent analysis, Polkinghorne (1995) distinguishes between two types of narrative research. One is “analysis of narratives,” which is research in the paradigmatic (Bruner, 1986) mode, usually qualitative, which collects and analyzes some form of a particular ethnic or occupational group, in order to arrive at generalizations about the group being studied. The second type is “narrative analysis,” which is research in the narrative mode, in which the researcher studies particular cases, either of individuals or of “bounded systems,” by collecting material, usually descriptions of events, and from them producing storied accounts which render the data meaningful. The former type of narrative research has a fairly long tradition in social science, whereas the latter is both more recent and poses a more radical challenge to accepted forms of inquiry. P.76
In analysis of narratives, the desired outcome is generalizations about a particular phenomenon based on the narratives generated by or about that phenomenon; in narrative analysis the desired outcome is not a generalization but a narrative which renders clear the meanings inherent in or generated by a particular subject. Narrative analysis as Polkinghorne describes it will be of primary interest here, because this mode of work gives rise to more concerns of a political nature; Narrative researchers often work on a small-scale, do not aspire to generalization in the usual sense, nor do they promise immediate practical benefits; yet they make strong claims for the authenticity and power of narrative researcher. They aspire to true collaboration and to the giving of voice to participants, yet still work from within traditional academic structures which value individuality, originality and ownership of intellectual products. These paradoxical circumstances give rise to confrontation with traditional modes of research. P.76
Since Dewey (1904), the relationship between theory and practice has been much discussed by educators. I find most helpful the treatment by Mckeon (1952) who spelled out different ways of conceptualizing the connection between , in his terms, philosophy and action. P.77
In
North America, the number of researchers doing narrative work seems to have reached a “critical mass,” and narrative researchers no lognger need to argue for the legitimacy of their methods with every new study. In smaller countries the academic community is likely to be more cautious and conservative. In
Israel, for example, narrative work is viewed with great interest, particularly among researchers who are close to the schools; nevertheless the question, “Yes, but is it research?” is still raised frequently. P.77
One of the first, and seemingly least problematic, assumptions of narrative research, has been the idea that it was important to have an understanding of teaching from an “emic” perspective, knowledge of teaching from the inside rather than knowledge about teaching from the vantage point of an observer. P.77
Another assumption has been that, because “top-down” prescriptions have been unsuccessful in improving teaching, educational practice can only be changed from inside, by practitioners working together, often with the help of researchers. P.77
A third assumption, which seems to build on the previous two (in an overly neat and idealized history of the development of narrative research) is that reflective teaching and school-based development, by themselves will be as unsuccessful in bringing about sustained change in educational practice as were other top-down theoretically-driven efforts. P.78
This search for a different kind of knowledge, knowledge which empowers rather than making possible prediction and control, is a significant reconceptualization of the purpose of educational research. P.78
It is not easy to give up power; but narrative researchers have not given it up so much as pointed to the illusory nature of the power of traditional research. This places the narrative researcher at odds with many of his or her colleagues. The criticism that research on teachers’ knowledge amounts to a celebration of the status quo, a glorification of whatever teachers happen to be doing rather than a search for best practice, may be, at least in part, a response to this situation. P.78
Furthermore, narrative research implies not only an alternative way of acquiring knowledge but also constitutes an alternative way of conceptualizing human nature. The idea that we live our lives as we tell our stories puts into questions many psychological formulations of human nature because it implies that personality is much more dynamic and open than many theories allow, is always in interaction with the social and cultural stories available to us, and academic don’t know more than ordinary people do about their own stories. All of this rests on a rethinking of the role of psychology (Sarbin, 1986; Bruner, 1986) and, perhaps more importantly, requires us to redefind our understanding of the terms objectivity and subjectivity (Barone, 1992, Eisner, 1992). P.78
True collaboration is extremely difficulty, and the status differential between teachers and university researcher (each of whom has quite different purposes and rewards for participating in research) always plays a role. Much has been written about th problems and pitfalls of collaborative research (e.g. Clandinin & Connelly, 1988). The de
All who where trained never to use the first person singular in academic writing can appreciate the difficulties involved in this change; we have invested a lot of energy in making a clear distinction between our personal and professional knowledge, and in keeping our personal stories out of the picture. Further, since all of us have private lives and are equal in this respect, the focus on the personal is yet another respect, the focus on the personal is yet another respect in which academics must relinquish their power over practitioners. Finally as researchers in a field which is unsure of its statue in the academy, we risk ridicule and deligitimation in bringing personal materials into the scientific endeavour. P.81
Personally I take inspiration from a number of writers: Barone (1989) tells of his personal encounter with a “student-at-risk.” Steedman (1986) tells the story of her mother’s life, focusing on the secrets which as a child she knew about from hints and awkward silences, and using these secrets to explore the meaning of working-class life and aspirations. Doll (1995) and hooks (1994) each tell of the development of their careers in academia and of their intellectual and personal development inside, outside and against the academy. In each case the author’s personal story is integral to the matters at hand, but what is being recounted is no longer the pat, insulated account of an isolated self; Each of these authors has searched for ways to present the self-in-relation and the self-in-opposition. But they offer no formulas; how exactly to give voice to personal stories is a matter that has to be figured out “from scratch” each time. P.81
The lives of “ordinary” people are, in this sense, just as potentially illuminating as the lives of those who have attained some form of externally defined greatness (Denzin, 1989) – a radical notion which challenges liberal views of progress and accomplishment. P.81
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이야기가 길어졌으므로 이쯤 해 두고.. 글쓰기에 있어서 필자가 중요하게 생각하는 몇 가지 원칙을 말하면-물론 이건 필자 개인의 생각일 뿐이다. 글쓰기에 교과서는 없다고 본다.
● 같은 단어의 반복을 피하는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 글쓰기의 기본은 같은 표현을 두 번 연속해서 쓰지 않는 것이다. 예컨대 개도 좋고 고양이도 좋다로 ‘좋다’를 반복하면 안 된다. 개도 좋고 고양이도 괜찮고 당나귀도 멋있고 토끼도 귀엾고.. 의도적으로 다른 표현을 쓴다.
● 단정적인 표현으로 긴장을 유발하기.. ‘그런 것 같다’거나 ‘아마 그럴 것이다’ 하는 식으로 애매하게 쓰지 않는다. 절대로, 반드시, 분명히.. 의도적으로 단호한 표현을 쓴다.
● 대칭을 부여하는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 산은 높고 물은 깊다는 식의.. 이건 앞에서 이야기 한 거고.. 근데 대칭구조도 여러 가지라.. 이 부분을 제대로 설명하려면 단행본 한 권은 써야 할 것이다.
● 리듬감을 부여하는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 끼리끼리 밀어주고 당겨주고 유유상종 배맞추고 눈맞추고 진드기붙고 껌붙고 붙어먹고 등쳐먹고.. 4.4조 혹은 3.4조의 시조체나 판소리체로 쓴다.
● 독자에게 말을 거는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기 ‘보라! 왜? 천만에! 과연 그럴까? 분명히 말한다. 웃기고 있네. 초딩은 가라!’
● 한 문단 안에 기승전결을 넣기.. 필자의 글은 아래한글 B5기준으로 3행씩 끊어져 있다. 2행씩 끊는 경우도 있다. 그 안에 기승전결이 있다. 억지로 3행을 맞추다 보니 중언부언 되는 수도. 심해져서 악벽이 되었다.
● 짧은 문장을 쓰는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 의도적으로 단문으로 만든다. 늘어지는 글은 질색이다. 종이로 된 단행본이면 장문이 유리할지도..
● 쉬운 우리말로 긴장을 유발하기.. 되도록이면 한자투의 전문용어보다 쉬운 우리말로 바꾸어 쓰는 것이 좋다.
● 신조어로 긴장을 유발하기.. 언어에도 유행이 있다. 예컨대 요즘 유행하는 진정성이라는 말은 국어사전에도 없는 말이다. 가끔 전문가들이나 쓰는 잘 알려지지 않은-생소한 용어를 한 단어 던져주는 것도 긴장을 유발하는 방법이다.
● 자문자답하기.. 왜? 왜인가? 무엇인가? 등등 질문과 그 질문에 호응하는 답변의 주고받음은 긴장을 유발한다.
● 비유하는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 모든 사건에는 일정한 구조의 닮은 꼴이 반복되는 패턴이 있다. 그 패턴을 터득하면 비유할 수 있게 된다. 이건 상당히 훈련해서 내공을 쌓아야 한다.
● 점입가경법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 어떤 시비를 걸 때는 일부러 사소한 부분을 물고 늘어진다. 처음부터 바로 본질을 치는 것이 아니라 사소한 부분을 가지고 변죽을 올리다가 차츰 중심부로 진입해 들어간다. 이건 딴나라 인간들도 잘 쓰는 방법인데 대통령의 말투가 어떻다 하는건 지극히 사소한 부분처럼 보이지만 그들이 강조하는 권위주의라는 본질과 닿아있다. 조중동의 친일행각을 과거에 저지른 사소한 실수라고 생각하는 사람도 있는데 천만의 말씀. 본질과 닿아있다. 사소한 가닥을 잡은 것 처럼 보이는데 고구마줄기에 고구마 끌려오듯 왕건이가 딸려온다. 이 경우 의도적으로 변방에서 작업을 시작한다.
● 문장의 순서를 바꾸는 방법으로 긴장을 유발하기.. 의도적으로 문법을 파괴하는 방법이 문법의 존재를 드러내어 오히려 글의 존재감을 높인다. 즉 글의 속에 숨은 글의 뼉다구를 드러내는 것이다. 예컨대 주어를 생략하는 방법도. 반대로 이처럼 술어를 생략하기도.
여러 가지를 이야기 했지만 본질은 긴장이다. 독자를 긴장시키는 글이 잘 쓴 글이다. 지루하게만 하지 않으면 기본은 된다. 모두가 이에 동의하지는 않겠지만 필자의 스타일은 그렇다.
가벼운 우스개로 지루하지 않게 하는 일은 누구나 할 수 있다. 심오한 주제로도 지루하지 않게 하는 것이 진짜다. 조중동식 비꼬기로 지루하지 않게 하는 것은 누구나 할 수 있다. 그러나 단지 비꼴 수 있을 뿐 대안은 줄 수 없다.
비 꼬기, 야유하기, 풍자하기, 말꼬리 잡기, 상대방이 쓴 말을 반대로 뒤집어서 되돌려주기, 얄팍한 주제, 상투적인 소재, 말초적인 웃음.. 조중동의 썩은 글이 늘 쓰는 수법이다. 이걸로 풍자할 수 있을 뿐 희망은 줄 수 없다.
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위에 열거한 방법을 모두 마스터 하면 글을 잘 쓸 수 있을까? 그건 아니다. 절대로 생각의 총량이 많지 않으면 안 된다.
영화를 보건, TV드라마를 보건, 만화를 보건, 소설을 읽건 한 편을 다 뗀 다음에 그 줄거리를 누군가에게 혹은 자기 자신에게 백번 쯤 반복하여 이야기 해 주는 방법을 썼다. 나중에는 그 전체과정을 암기할 정도가 되었다.
이야기하다 보면 작가의 숨겨진 의도가 드러난다. 영화를 볼 때 혹은 소설을 읽을 때는 몰랐던 부분이 내가 그 이야기의 줄거리를 타인에게 이야기해 줄 때 깨닫게 되는 것이다.
이것이 가장 중요한 글쓰기 훈련이다. 글 이전에 생각하기 훈련이다. 글은 그 고인 생각을 퍼내는 것에 불과하다. 생각이 먼저고 글은 나중이다. 생각이 쌓이고 쌓여서 둑이 넘치듯 터져나오지 않으면 쓸 수 없다.
모든 것은 커다란 의심으로부터 시작된다. 마음에 큰 의혹이라는 씨앗을 심어두면 그 씨앗이 점점 자라서 뿌리를 내리고 싹을 틔우고 꽃을 피우고 글이라는 열매로 영글어가는 것이다.
반항심이 있어야 한다. 세상을 향한 싸움걸기의 자세가 되어 있어야 한다. 세상 전부를 향해 원초적으로 크게 대립각을 세우지 않으면 안 된다. 그리고 그 쌓인 것을 낱낱이 풀어내는 것이다
